Redundant actuator development study by Ryder, D. R.
NASA CR-114730
REDUNDANT "ACTUATOR
DEVELOPMENT STUDY
Final Report
By D. R. Ryder
(NASA-CR-114730) REDUNDANT ACTUATOR N74-21655
jDEVELOPENT STUDY Final Report (Boeing
Commercial Airplane Co., Seattle)874 p
HC $6.75 CSCL 01C Unclas
G3/02 37553
Prepared under contract NAS2-7653
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY
Seattle, Washington 98124
for
Ames Research Center,, Moffett Field, California
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ASMINISTRATION
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19740013542 2020-03-23T09:33:57+00:00Z
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
NASA CR-114730
4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date
December 1973
REDUNDANT ACTUATOR DEVELOPMENT STUDY 6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No.
D. R. Ryder D6-41511
10. Work Unit No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY 11. Contract or Grant No.
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, Washington 98124 13. Type of Report and Period Covered
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Contractor Report
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 14. Sponsoring Agency Code
Washington, D.C. 20546
15. Supplementary Notes
This study was monitored by Mr. R. C. McCracken of
Ames Research Center
16. Abstract
Current and past supersonic transport configurations have been reviewed
to assess redundancy requirements for future airplane control systems.
Secondary actuators used in stability augmentation systems will probably
be the most critical actuator application and require the highest level
of redundancy. Two methods of actuator redundancy mechanization have
been recommended for further study. Math models of the recommended
systems have been developed for use in future computer simulations. A
long range plan has been formulated that will lead to actuator hardware
development and testing in conjunction with the NASA Flight Simulator
for Advanced Aircraft at Ames Research Center.
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statement
redundant actuator Unclassified - Unlimited
control system
unstable airplane
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price*
Unclassified Unclassified I9 1 41 8
*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151
CONTENTS
Page
1.0 SUMMARY 1
2.0 INTRODUCTION 2
3.0 STUDY TASKS h
3.1 TASK 1 - REVIEW OF REDUNDANT ACTUATION 4
DEVELOPMENT FOR SST APPLICATION
3.2 TASK 2 - SELECTION OF RECOMMENDED 28
ACTUATION SYSTEMS
3.3 TASK 3 - FORMULATION OF MATH MODELS OF THE 14
RECOMMENDED SYSTEMS
3.4 TASK 4 - LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR 36
REDUNDANT ACTUATION DEVELOPMENT
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 40
I*1
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
I MULTIPLE OUTPUT UTILIZATION 41
2 BOEING SST HORIZONTAL STABILIZER ACTUATION SYSTEM 42
3 FUNCTIONAL SCHEMATIC OF SECONDARY ACTUATOR 43
INTEGRATED WITH THE SURFACE POWER CONTROL ACTUATOR
4 MOTION VS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE FOR BYPASS DETENT 44
5 HRM-A SECONDARY ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC SCHEMATIC 45
6 HYDRAULIC LOGIC SERVOVALVE SCHEMATIC 46
7 HRM-C SECONDARY ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC SCHEMATIC 47
8 F-8C SECONDARY ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC SCHEMATIC . 48
9 MECHANICAL SCHEMATIC, SECONDARY ACTUATOR SUMMING 49
10 HYDRAULIC SCHEMATIC, SINGLE ACTUATOR ELEMENT 50
11 MRCA SECONDARY ACTUATOR 51
12 747 TRIPLE-PITCH CHANNEL CONFIGURATION 52
13 SIMPLIFIED BLOCK DIAGRAM OF 747 TRIPLE MID VALUE 53
VOTER
14 L1011 DUAL SECONDARY ACTUATOR 54
15 L1011 ROLL AND PITCH BLOCK DIAGRAM 55
16 CONCORDE DUAL ACTUATOR 56
17 CONCORDE ELEVON CONTROLS--OUTER LOOP MONITORING 57
FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM
18 FORCE-VOTED SECONDARY ACTUATOR, SINGLE ACTUATOR 58
ELEMENT
19 ACTIVE STANDBY ACTUATOR, SINGLE ACTUATOR ELEMENT 59
20 FORCE-VOTED MATH MODEL 60
21 FAILURE DETECTION/EQUALIZATION 61
22 ACTIVE/STANDBY MATH MODEL 62
23 SURFACE ACTUATOR MODEL 63
//
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A Piston area
B1  Linkage freeplay
B2  Hysteresis due to friction
Cp Flow gain/pressure gain
D Damping
D&ero Aerodynamic damping
Ff Coulomb friction
FSAA Flight Simulator for Advanced Aircraft
F Actuator force output
H Feedback gain
K Actuator dynamic spring
Ka Servo amp gain
Kc Centering spring rate
Kd Failure detection gain
Kdm Demodulator gain
KE Equalization gain
Kf Feedback amplifier gain
K i  Actuator input lever gear ratio
KL Open loop gain
Kp Valve pressure gain
KS 1  Actuator structural spring
KS2 Actuator rod spring
K Valve flow gain
K LVDT output
L Actuator total stroke
LVDT Linear Variable Differential Transformer
ML Load mass
PL Actuator load pressure
Pm Maximum actuator nsP
PS System supply pressure
PT Bypass pressure AP
S Laplace operator.
V Input signal voltage
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REDUNDANT ACTUATOR DEVELOPMENT STUDY
By D. R. Ryder
1.0 SUMMARY
This report is submitted in compliance with contract
NAS2-7653. Multiple redundant actuators applicable
to advanced supersonic transport flight control sys-
tems have been studied. The study included the review
of recent developments in redundant control systems
and control requirements of supersonic transport con-
figurations. Secondary actuators used in stability
augmentation systems were found to require the highest
level of redundancy. Two methods of actuator redundancy
mechanization representative of those that will most
likely be used in future airplanes have been recommended
for further study. Actuator math models of the two
methods of actuator redundancy have been developed
that will allow investigation of wide range of actua-
tor failures, mechanization of failure detection and
channel equalization methods, and adjustment of actu-
ator parameters to match the requirements of various
advanced airplanes. A long range plan has been form-
ulated that will lead to actuator hardware development
and testing in conjunction with the NASA Ames Flight
Simulator for Advanced Aircraft (FSAA) to allow
investigation of pilot and control system interaction.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
Any advanced supersonic transport airplane will have to be
economically competitive with large subsonic airplanes.
Economic supersonic flight will require taking advantage
of all possible gains in aerodynamic efficiency and reduc-
tions in airplane weight. It will probably require using
configurations that are unstable in the pitch axis. For
these configurations to be safe and have acceptable handling
qualities, the airplane stability must be augmented through
the control system. Since the stability of the airplane
then becomes flight critical, the control system reliability
must approach that of the basic airframe.
Fault corrective capability that will meet the system
reliability requirements and also satisfy the FAA regula-
tions dictate flight control system configurations that
can survive two failures and still remain operational.
The performance level after failure may degrade to less
than normal but must remain adequate to complete the mis-
sion. Safe operation after failure may require a restricted
flight envelope.
Use of redundancy to achieve reliability has always been an
accepted engineering design technique. However, the advan-
tages of redundancy are not easily realized in control
systems because of signal channel interaction, failure
effects, performance degradation after failures, null shift
with channel changes, and failure detection problems. If
force summed multiple actuators are used to drive a single
load, actuator load sharing becomes a concern. Methods of
insuring proper load sharing can reduce load reaction stiff-
ness, cause poor resolution, and may lead to dynamic
instability if not properly designed and built. Monitoring
used to effect the orderly shutdown of failure elements may
cause inadvertent shutdown of good elements. All of these
problem areas with respect to redundant actuators show a
need for further study of actuator redundancy. The inter-
action of pilots and airplanes with redundant control
system designs is important because of performance changes
and control transients that occur with failure or actuator
shutdown. The NASA Ames Flight Simulator for Advanced
Aircraft (FSAA) is well suited to investigation of
advanced control systems.
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This report covers the initial portion of a study that will
culminate in control system hardware (or mini-rig) con-
nected to the FSAA. This initial portion of the study
includes the selection of redundant actuator concepts that
are representative of those that will most likely be used
in advanced flight control systems, the development of
math models of those systems, and formulation of a plan
for the next phase of the study program.
3.0 STUDY TASKS
This study has been divided into four tasks. A report on
the work performed in completion of the tasks is covered
in this section.
3.1 TASK 1 - REVIEW OF REDUNDANT ACTUATION DEVELOPMENT FOR SST
APPLICATION
3.1.1 Airplane Configuration and Control Redundancy Requirements
The starting point for this study was to review current and
past supersonic transport configurations as well as non SST
work to survey the various redundancy mechanization schemes
used in both surface power actuators and secondary actuators.
Secondary actuators are defined as small actuators used in
a fly-by-wire, autopilot, or stability augmentation control
systems as a stage of amplification and a method of con-
verting an electrical signal into a mechanical displacement.
Examination of these configurations and their control
requirements has led to two conclusions:
o The minimum redundancy requirements for surface power
actuators are basically the same for flight control
surfaces on all advanced supersonic transport
configurations.
o The most stringent redundancy requirements will be set
by stability augmentation systems used on unstable
airplane configurations.
The discussion that follows develops the reasoning behind
these conclusions.
Economic supersonic flight will require the lightest possible
airplane. The need to minimize airplane weight reduces the
permissible use of mass balance of control surfaces about
the hinge line as a means of preventing control surface
flutter. If mass balance is not used, the surface must be
restrained by the surface power control actuators.
The Federal Aviation Regulations, Volume III, Part 25,
paragraph 25.629, "Flutter, deformation, and fail-safe
criteria," requires that an airplane be free from flutter
after any single failure in the flight control system,
plus any other "reasonably probable" single failure or mal-
function affecting flutter. Hydraulic system failures are
classified as "reasonably probable" by the FAA. Therefore,
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when airplane design dictates that control surfaces be
restrained by the flight control system to avoid the mass bal-
ance weight penalty, these requirements dictate a need for at
least two surface power actuators and three hydraulic systems
for each surface. As an example, the Concorde utilizes two
surface power actuators per surface, each with a separate
hydraulic supply, plus a third standby hydraulic system which
can be switched to supply either actuator. This is an accept-
able system only if a failure analysis shows that a single
failure such as a leak in one actuator which could deplete a
normal system and the standby system in combination with
another hydraulic system failure is extremely remote.
Independent of considerations for suppression of surface
flutter, surface power actuator redundancy is also influenced
by the need to maintain control of the airplane flight path.
The Federal Aviation Regulations, Volume III, Part 25,
paragraph 25.671, requires, in part, that the airplane must
be capable of safe flight and landing after any single failure,
excluding jamming, in combination with any probable hydraulic
system failure.
One form of redundancy to assure continuance of control
function would be to use multiple aerodynamic surface seg-
ments, independently controlled, in each airplane axis. If
actuator redundancy were not required for prevention of flut-
ter, each surface could be controlled by a single actuator.
Degraded, but safe, operation could be possible if one or
more surface segments became inoperable.
There seems little doubt that the need for maximum aerodynamic
efficiency and minimum weight in an advanced supersonic trans-
port would prohibit consideration of either a multiplicity of
aerodynamic control surfaces for control system redundancy
or use of mass balance for flutter prevention. These two
factors are sufficient to set the minimum redundancy level
for surface power actuators. The most efficient and safe mech-
anization will be three surface power actuators per surface,
each supplied by separate and independent hydraulic systems.
It has been shown in previous studies by Boeing and others
that gains in aerodynamic efficiency and reduction in air-
plane weight can be achieved by placing the operating center
of gravity aft of the longitudinal maneuver point.
(References 2 and 3). The resulting unstable airplane must
be augmented through the flight control system to provide
acceptable handling qualities. If the stability of the air-
plane is critical such that loss of the augmentation means
loss of the airplane, the control system reliability must
approach that of the basic airplane. To achieve this level
of reliability, special considerations must go into the
design. Such considerations include design simplification,
derating of components, elimination of electrical connectors,
and physical isolation of electrical wiring and hydraulic
power. Even with these considerations redundancy is usually
required to get satisfactory reliability from complex
electronic control systems and actuators.
It is believed that for any future advanced supersonic
transport, airplane requirements will dictate reliance on
flight critical systems requiring a minimum of four augmen-
tation channels or three channels appropriately monitored.
This level of redundancy is the minimum required to insure
continued safe control of the airplane after two failures.
3.1.2 Secondary Actuator Redundancy
The power levels associated with the electronic stability
augmentation system must be kept at low levels as a matter
of good design. These low level commands are required to
command surface actuators that operate at high power levels.
Converting the low level electrical commands to surface dis-
placements controlled by hydraulic power requires several
stages of amplification.
Review of current redundant actuation systems shows an
almost universal use of secondary actuators as one of the
stages of amplification. Using secondary actuators provides
a convenient method of reducing four channels of augmentation
signals to the command required for'the two or three surface
power actuators. Secondary actuators provide a single valued
mechanical input which allows utilization of simple reliable
mechanical surface actuators.
The most prevalent methods of forming a single valued
mechanical signal at the secondary actuator output are
force summation, displacement summation, and active/standby
operation. These mechanization methods are illustrated in
figure 1i. Rate summing of signals is another method of
secondary actuator mechanization being used.
3.1.3 Survey of Current Actuator Redundancy Mechanization
The survey of current redundant actuation systems resulted
in examination of ten flight control systems listed below.
With the exception of the commercial airplane systems (747,
L-1011 and Concorde), all meet the operation capability
required for an advanced supersonic transport.
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Control Systems Examined
... Boeing SST Horizontal Stabilizer Actuation System
2. Space Shuttle HRM-A Secondary Actuator
3. Space Shuttle HRM-C Secondary Actuator
4. NASA F8-C Fly-by-Wire Secondary Actuator
5. General Electric 680J Secondary Actuator
6. MRCA Secondary Actuator
7. Boeing 747 Elevator Control System
8. Lockheed L-1011 Longitudinal Control
9. Concorde Elevon Control
10. LTV 680J Electromechanical Secondary Actuator
Comparison Factors
This section contains a discussion of the important factors
used by the investigator to evaluate the systems. This dis-
cussion is placed before the description of each system to
aid the reader in identifying system differences. Description
of the LTV electromechanical secondary actuator is not in-
cluded. Boeing SST studies indicated that this type of system
would have difficulty meeting FAA requirements for flight
critical systems.
1. Load Sharing
Load sharing is a measure of the ability of multiple
actuators to work together in positioning a common
output. Load sharing is a problem peculiar to force
summed actuators since, obviously, there is no force
fighting in an active/standby system when only one
system controls at a time or in a position summed
system where forces of individual actuators are additive.
There are several methods used in achieving load sharing.
Ideally, it is desirable that the load be divided equally
among redundant actuators to eliminate any force fighting.
However, since each actuator tries to position the load
according to the net command it senses, any differences
in the effective commands cause force fighting to occur
between the actuators. By net command differences are
meant the tracking errors that arise due to tolerance
buildup in each actuator servo loop and actuator instal-
lation. To minimize force fighting in multiple actuators
and assure acceptable sharing .of the load, four methods
are commonly used:
a. Provide accurate tolerance control of the feedback
loop of the actuator.
A mechanical actuator is fairly easy to mechanize
with good tolerance control because of the manu-
facturing accuracies that can be obtained and the
unchanging nature of the mechanical linkages.
As an example, if a single mechanical servo valve
with multiple control sections is used to control
multiple actuators, the valve can be machined to
tolerances which assure reasonable load sharing
usually within 10 percent of system force capability.
An electrically controlled actuator has elements
such as summing amplifiers, demodulators, and feed-
back transducers which can change characteristics
with time, temperature and power. It is generally
accepted that the tolerances associated with an
electronically controlled actuator are signifi-
cantly greater than for a mechanically controlled
actuator.
b. Provide sufficient compliance to reduce force
fighting.
In some applications the structural compliance
between actuators can be designed to reduce force
fighting. In other applications feeding back
deflections of the actuators reaction structure
has been sufficient to provide the desired load
sharing. When structural feedback or compliance
between actuators is insufficient or undesirable
from other aspects, static pressure feedback has
been used to provide the required compliance.
Feeding back a signal proportional to differential
pressure has the effect of increasing the actuator
compliance, thereby reducing the force differences.
This signal can be an all mechanical feedback to a
mechanically controlled actuator or can be electri-
cal to an electronically controlled actuator.
However, there is a limit to the amount of compliance
that can be achieved without reducing the overall
stiffness below a minimum allowable level. This
method has been used successfully where the inputs
are reasonably matched, such as a set of surface
power actuators signalled by a common mechanical
command or in secondary actuators where the output
load is small.
c. Equalization to average load.
For cases where the actuators are required to
operate into large aerodynamic loads and have
uncontrolled input mismatch the pressure feedback
system requires modification to be useful. The
individual actuator feedback must be compared to
the average load. Computation of the average load
and the individual difference from averaging
require cross channel comparison. This method
does not degrade actuator stiffness.
2. Input Mismatch
Although mismatched inputs to a multiple actuator
system create a load sharing problem, methods of elim-
inating or minimizing mismatch require separate
discussion. Differences in commands (input mismatch)
that can build up due to tolerances in an electrical
control system from sensor to actuator can be quite
high, as much as a quarter of full scale command,
unless some design action is taken to prevent such
buildup. It should be noted that difference in com-
mands generated by actuator loop tolerances are an
order of magnitude less than those generated by
computational elements in the upstream portions of
the system.
It is advantageous to treat the computation errors and
actuation errors independently by inserting a synchron-
izing stage between the two functions. The
synchronizing stage provides a single valued command
and may be an electronic voter or a mechanical output
of a secondary actuator arrangement. Some of the
advantages of synchronizing are:
o If the surface power actuators can be isolated
from the upstream command differences, the task
of providing adequate load becomes easier, per-
mitting a simpler and more reliable mechanization
of the power stage.
o A secondary actuator that provides a synchronizing
stage can operate at relatively low-force levels.
If properly designed, it can provide the high levels
of confidence, freedom from catastrophic failures,
and immunity from outside interference.
Although a secondary actuator arrangement can provide
a single valued command to a set of surface power
actuators, the problem of input mismatch is not elim-
inated but transferred to the secondary actuator.
However, the magnitude of the problem is less severe
because the secondary actuators operate at significantly
lower force levels. The methods of secondary actuator
mechanization to deal with the mismatch problem are
itemized below.
o Force Voting
By force voting several actuators on a common output
an output representing the mid value of all commands
can be achieved. Feedback can be used to increase
input mismatch allowables. In some applications the
only possible way of controlling command differences
may be the use of electronic signal conditioning
to provide less of an input mismatch.
o Active/Standby
Usually the active actuator is commanded by a single
electronic channel and mismatch is of no concern
during operation. Mismatches between the commands
of the active and the standby channel are of concern,
however, and must be minimized to avoid large sur-
face transients upon switching from active to standby
actuators.
o Position Summing
Position summing secondary actuators differently
results in a single output which is the average of
the input commands.
o Rate Summing
Rate summing secondary actuators allow the
individual channels to cancel command differences
by differentially summing rates.
3. Failure Insensitivity
Failure insensitivity is- the ability of the redundant
system to accept a failure and automatically continue
operation with a minimum surface transient. If the
system performs a critical function, operation must
be maintained in the presence of a failure; i.e., be
fail operational. However, a fail-operational system
does not insure minimum surface transients. The
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criticality of transients has an impact on the detail
design of the system. Several means of providing fail
operational capability are discussed below.
a. Fail-operational capability can be achieved by
majority voting three or more active actuators.
With three active channels, operation continues
after the first failure. With four channels,
operation continues after two failures, if the
first failed channel is disconnected before the
second channel fails.
Majority voting can be mechanized either by force
voting or by displacement summing. In the force
voted system the failed channel is automatically
overpowered by the remaining channels and the
magnitude of the surface transient can be insigni-
ficant. Displacement summing provides an average
output but has an inherent surface transient and
a steady state null offset. The magnitude transient
is dependent upon the closed loop system response.
b. Another approach is to use a monitor and comparator
or failure detection device to assess which channel
of the system has failed and automatically dis-
connect it. This approach may be used to maintain
fail-operational capability with fewer channels
if each channel is monitored for failures indepen-
dently. Another method of reducing the number of
working channels is to add a model of a working
channel and use cross channel monitoring for failure
detection. While this extends operational capability
with one less active channel its effectiveness
depends on how well the model matches the actual
hardware. In certain applications, where actuators
are large and where weight is critical, the model
approach may provide a way to minimize the overall
weight.
c. When it is possible to use multiple aerodynamic
segments, independently controlled, degraded but
safe operation may be possible with one or more
segment failed. This feature is used in current
airplanes. However, as explained previously,
advanced supersonic airplanes will probably be
limited in use of control surface redundancy par-
ticularly in the longitudinal axis because of the
need to attain maximum aerodynamic efficiency.
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. Failure Detection Capability
Failure detection and indication of failures during
operation must be provided so that the failed channel
can be turned off to preserve the integrity of the
system. The failure detection system must be designed
to detect all types of failures; active, passive,
oscillatory, slow overs or ramps which could themselves
or in combination with another failure produce an unsafe
situation.
In some mechanizations, immediate failure detection is
required to keep the airplane safe. For instance in an
active/standby system rapid detection of the first fail-
ure and automatic switching to the standby is mandatory
to avoid large surface transients which could overstress
the airplane.
The ability of the failure detection system to sort out
legitimate failures from apparent failures such as
might occur due to adverse tolerances has an equivalence
in reliability. If the failure detection system trips
a channel off inadvertently due to an apparent failure,
the equivalent mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) for the
system may be significantly affected.
5, Self Testing Capability
Preflight self testing will be required to detect those
failures that may not normally be detected by the in-
flight failure detector. The test should be simple but
yet complete enough to assure with confidence that the
redundant system is in satisfactory condition. It is
desirable that the self test be of the push-to-test for
a "Go," "No-Go" indication. Quantitative measurements
should be avoided, in favor of more simple continuity
testing. Systems should be able to be tested by using
the normal failure monitors to sense the presence of an
inserted test signal.
The quality of self test features also has an equivalence
in reliability since testing reduces the exposure time
to an undetected failure.
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6. Reliability
The reliability requirement for a particular system is
based on the function it performs, the consequences of
failure, and the duration of each mission. Primary
assessment will assume the requirement for a system
to remain operational after two failures. However,
as a system becomes more complex, more failures will
occur and reduce overall reliability even though the
the requirement to remain operational after two
failures has been met.
7. Simplicity
While redundancy increases in-flight reliability and
provides various degrees of flight control operation
dependent upon requirements, redundancy does increase
the initial procurement cost as well as maintenance
cost and is reflected in increased maintenance work
load.
If the function can be done with a less complex mechanism,
usually it can be done more reliably, as there are fewer
things to go wrong. Also, the cost will be less. As
noted above, failure detection and checkout capability
must be included in the system definition, and this can
grow to be a very significant part of the total system
complexity.
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3.1.3.1 Boeing SST Horizontal Stabilizer Actuation System
The all-moving horizontal stabilizer of the Boeing SST
was powered by four surface power actuators arranged side
by side, each supplied by a separate and independent hydrau-
lic system. The actuator size was chosen to provide hinge
moment capability for safe control and to meet flutter
requirements with any two hydraulic systems failed. Though
three surface actuators would have met redundancy require-
ments, four actuators were used in order to reduce the
amount of installed hinge moment capacity. If three actuators
had been used, each would have been required to meet the min-
imum hinge moment requirement and the total capacity would
have been three times the minimum. When four actuators are
used each can satisfy one half the minimum requirements. The
total installation has only two times the minimum requirement.
The stability augmentation system and secondary actuators
were also four channel to provide operational capability after
two failures.
The overall SST pitch control system is shown in figure 2.
The secondary actuators used for stability augmentation were
termed EC servos on the SST because they also received
"electrical command" (EC) signals from the pilot controls.
The output of the secondary actuator was summed with the
pilot's mechanical input system on a differential link. The
secondary actuators were integrated with (built as a part of)
the surface power actuators as shown in figure 3. This
mechanization has the advantage of having the summing linkage
that receives the secondary actuator output protected inside
an oil filled cavity. The outputs of the four secondary
actuators were force voted on a torque tube (identified as
the EC sync shaft and detent in figure 3). Each actuator
connection to the torque tube was through a detent mechanism
that allowed motion of the torque tube with any secondary
actuator jammed. If a secondary actuator was shut off or
received an erroneous signal, those remaining could provide
inputs to all four surface power actuators. If a secondary
actuator Jammed, the surface power actuator that it was a
part of could not receive proper signals and had to be shut
off.
The secondary actuator piston was controlled by an
electrohydraulic servovalve with the position loop closed
electronically in a servo amplifier. Across each piston was
connected a spring detented bypass valve set to open when
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the differential pressure reached 292 psi which equaled a
reflected load on the piston of 150 pounds. The bypass
valve motion versus differential pressure is shown in figure 4.
The valve motion was converted to an electrical signal by a
linear differential transformer (LVDT). Pressure unbalances
of either a steady state or dynamic nature that occurred
between channels were corrected by feeding back to the servo
amplifier two voltages; one proportional to the displacement
of the bypass valve to equalize dynamic differences in com-
mands, and one proportional to the integral of the bypass
valve displacement to equalize any steady state differences
in commands whenever the proportional equalization signal
exceeded a chosen threshold for a set interval of time, the
channel annunciated to the flight crew. The flight crew
then manually shut down the secondary actuator portion of
the failed control channel.
If two channels had failed and had been shut off, the
remaining two secondary actuators remained operational.
Upon a third failure, the system force voted to null by
the centering springs of the shutoff channels, rendering
the system passive. This mechanization method minimized
surface transients for any single failure and did not
rely on failure detection for safety.
3.1.3.2 Space Shuttle HRM-A Secondary Actuator
The servo actuator is an electrohydraulic, three-channel,
active/standby configuration developed by Hydraulic Research
and Manufacturing Company (HRM). The actuator description
was obtained from reference 6. This actuator is an imple-
mentation of redundant hydraulic control employing monitoring
to attain the capability to sustain two failures and continue
to operate.
A modular design approach was used. The actuator (figure 5)
consists of three independent systems or modules with complete
hydraulic isolation that control a triple tandem piston. Only
one system controls the actuator at any one time. If a mal-
function occurs in the controlling system, a switch is made
to a standby system, thus, there is neither a loss in output
force nor a performance degradation after the failure. Each
system has two electrohydraulic servovalves, one which controls
flow to its piston and one monitor servovalve which monitors
the second stage spool position of the active servovalve.
These six servovalves are modified HRM model 25 two-stage
nozzle flapper valves. The servovalve consists of an
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electrical torque motor and hydraulic output stage. The
output stage of the active valve is a closed center slide
valve which means that the spool is designed to block fluid
flow when at the null position. Current flowing in the
torque motor coils induces a torque in the armature, which
pivots the flapper slightly toward a nozzle. This motion
unbalances the hydraulic amplifier circuit, causing a pressure
difference to be generated between the two end chambers of
the second stage spool. This pressure difference creates
motion in the second stage spool. Spool position is reflected
as feedback torque on the torque motor armature by means of
the mechanical feedback spring. Thus by closing the servo
mechanism loop, spool position is proportional to input
current. Rectangular metering slots in the second stage
spool cause flow proportional to input current.
The HRM model 25 valve has been modified by adding a second
monitor flapper and nozzle (figure 6). The only difference
between the active servovalves and the monitor valves is that
the monitor valves have a blank spool in place of the second
stage spool and sleeve. Both of them have a monitor flapper
and nozzle. The function of the monitor flapper and nozzle
is to develop pressures proportional to the position of the
second stage elements of the active and monitor valves.
These two pressures are fed to opposite ends of a comparator
spool. If no malfunction occurs these two pressures will
vary but will remain equal in magnitude and the comparator
spool will remain centered.
The system operates in the following manner. Referring to
figure 5, after hydraulic pressure is available, all three
"on" solenoid valves are pulsed to engage the system. Once
pulsed, each solenoid valve is held on its seat by its system
hydraulic pressure. This pressure drives the three engage
valves against the engage valve spring located at the left
end of the system 3 engage valves. This activates system 1.
The active servovalve in system 1 controls the actuator.
The pistons of systems 2 and 3 are bypassed and the output
ports of "active" valves 2 and 3 are blocked by their engage
valves.
If a malfunction occurs, the second stage positions of the
active and monitor valves will differ. This will cause a
pressure difference on the comparator spool creating motion
of the spool. When the pressure difference exceeds a pre-
determined threshold, motion of the comparator spool will
dump the system 1 pressure that has been holding the engage
valve against the spring to return. The engage valve moves
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to the right until it is stopped by the system 2 position
piston. System 1 engage valve is then in the bypass position.
The bypass position connects the cylinder ends of system 1
piston and blocks the output of the active servovalve of
system 1. System 2 will then become the active channel and
will operate in exactly the same way as system 1. The failure
threshold of the comparator can be easily varied. After the
optimum threshold is determined by test, it will remain fixed
in the design.
If a malfunction occurs in system 2, a switchover to system 3
will be accomplished in the same manner. If system 2 has
previously failed, the switch will be from system 1 to
system 3. In this design, only a channel that is operational
is capable of gaining control of the actuator.
A third failure will cause the actuator to fail in a bypass
mode on all three systems. System failure is detected by
a pressure switch on each comparator valve.
Pressure loss in any system that exceeds a predetermined
threshold will cause the ball in the solenoid valve to
unseat, thus, switching to the next channel.
After malfunction, any one system will not come back on line
until the "on" solenoid valve is pulsed. If the malfunction
has been corrected, input to the comparator from the active
and monitor channels will be identical, indicating the system
is capable of normal operation. If the malfunction is still
present, the system will immediately switch off line as
before.
Attached to the actuator output are four position feedback
linear variable differential transducers (LVDTs). One LVDT
is dedicated to each of the three channels for servo position
feedback and all LVDT signals are used for LVDT failure
detection logic. This logic uses a cross channel failure
detection method. Each LVDT signal is compared with the
signals from all other working LVDTs. A fail decision is
made if the signal of that LVDT differs appreciably from that
of the other LVDTs. The failure threshold is an error volt-
age equal to that generated by displacing the actuator five
percent of full travel. The detection of a failure energizes
a latching relay which provides a positive d.c. bias voltage
to the monitor servo amplifier. This causes the hydraulic
logic to disengage the channel with the failed LVDT.
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3.1.3.3 Space Shuttle HRM-C Secondary Actuator
This servoactuator is an electrohydraulic, three-channel,
force-summing configuration developed by Hydraulic Research
and Manufacturing Company (HRM). The actuator description
is based on information given in reference 7. This actuator
is an implementation of redundant control employing indivi-
dual channel monitoring using duplicated signal paths to
provide failure monitoring for channel shutdown.
A modular design approach is used to provide the required
redundancy. This actuator (figure 7) consists of three
independent systems or modules with complete hydraulic isola-
tion controlling triple tandem pistons. All systems that are
operating control the actuator. When a malfunction occurs 
in
any system, that system is blocked by a shutoff/bypass valve,
and the force output capability of the actuator is decreased
proportionally. The actuator piston for that system goes
into a bypass mode. Each system has an active two stage
electrohydraulic servovalve which controls flow to its piston
and a second electrohydraulic servovalve which is used to
monitor the second stage spool position of the active servo-
valve. The active and monitor valves are identical to those
described in section 3.1.3.2. The pressures induced by the
monitor flapper and nozzle portions of the active and
monitor valves are fed to opposite ends of a comparator spool.
With normal operation, the pressures will vary but will
remain equal. Motion of the comparator spool beyond a
predetermined threshold due to unequal pressures is an
indication of failure.
The actuator operates in the following manner. Referring to
figure 7, after hydraulic pressure is available, the three
"on" solenoid valves are pulsed to engage the actuator. Once
pulsed, the solenoid valves are held on their seats by system
hydraulic pressure. This pressure drives the three shutoff
valves against their springs and activates the three systems.
The active servovalve in each system controls each section
of the actuator.
If a malfunction occurs the outputs of an active and monitor
valve will differ. This will cause a pressure difference on
a comparator spool causing motion of the spool. When the
pressure difference exceeds a predetermined threshold, 
motion
of the comparator spool will dump the supply pressure that
had been holding the shutoff valve of that system to return.
The shutoff valve of the failed system will be forced by
the spring pressure into a bypass position. The bypass posi-
tion blocks the output of the active servovalve of the failed
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system and connects the cylinder ports to permit the
actuator to operate with the remaining controlling systems.
System failure is detected by a pressure switch on the
comparator valve.
The failure threshold of the comparator can be easily varied
by either changing the spring rate or overlap of the com-
parator spool. Once the optimum threshold is determined by
test on a particular system it will remain fixed.
If a malfunction occurs in a second system it will be also
placed into a bypass mode. The remaining system will con-
tinue to control the actuator. The sequence of system
failure is no problem. All systems are operational and
only a failed system is switched out. A third failure will
cause the actuator to go to a bypass mode on all three
systems.
After a malfunction a failed system will not come back on line
until the "on" solenoid valve for that system is pulsed. If
the malfunction has been corrected, pressure will hold the
solenoid valve ball on its seat, the input to the comparator
spool from the active and monitor valves will be identical,
the shutoff valve will be pressurized, and the pressure switch
will cycle, thus returning the system to normal operation.
If the malfunction is still present, the system will
immediately switch out as before.
Differential pressure transducers are used to provide
pressure feedback information for an electrical pressure
gain reduction circuit. A pressure transducer sensing pres-
sure across each piston generates zero voltage at zero
differential pressure and 20 millivolts at 3000 psi differ-
ential pressure. The differential pressure feedback reduces
the pressure gain (per system) from 6000 to 9000 psi per
milliampere to approximately 750 psi per milliampere. This
gain reduction reduces the possibility of deadband resulting
from actuator force fighting.
Attached to the actuator output are four position feedback
linear variable differential transducers (LVDTs). One LVDT
is dedicated to each of the three systems for servo position
feedback and all four LVDT signals are used for LVDT failure
detection. A cross-channel failure detection method is used.
Each LVDT signal is compared with the signals from all other
working LVDTs. A fail decision is made if the signal of the
LVDT differs appreciably from that of the other LVDTs. The
failure threshold is an error voltage equal to that generated
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by displacing the actuator five percent of full travel. The
detection of an LVDT failure energizes a latching relay which
provides a positive d.c. bias voltage to the monitor servo-
amplifier. This causes the hydraulic logic to disengage the
channel with the failed LVDT. By using this LVDT failure
detection method the number of LVDTs required to make the
actuation mechanization work is reduced from 6 to 4.
3.1.3.4 NASA F8-C Fly-By-Wire Secondary Actuator
The system consists of four electrohydraulic control channels
and triple tandem pistons. One of the control channels has
an active electrohydraulic servovalve plus a monitor servo-
valve. Referring to figure 8, this is identified as servo
system 1. The system is an active/standby configuration which
consists of the monitored primary channel (servo system 1)
with hydraulic logic failure detection and three force summed
standby channels with electronic failure detection. The
total package is supplied by two separate hydraulic supplies.
The design provides complete hydraulic system isolation.
Servo system 1 consists of two two-stage, flapper nozzle
servovalves, one active and one a monitor. These valves are
the same as those described in paragraph 3.1.3.2. The active
valve controls the actuator output and is monitored hydraul-
ically by the monitor servovalve and hydraulic comparator.
If a failure occurs, the outputs of the active and monitor
valves will differ. This will cause a pressure difference
on the comparator spool, causing spool displacement. When
the pressure difference exceeds a predetermined threshold,
displacement of the comparator spool will dump to return the
supply pressure holding the engage valve. The engage valve
of servo system 1 will be forced by spring force into a
blocked position. The blocked position blocks the output of
the active servovalve of system 1. The failure threshold
of the comparator can be easily varied by spring rate
adjustment or overlap of the comparator spool.
After hydraulic pressure is applied and the No. 1 solenoid
valve is energized to engage the system, the solenoid valve
is held on the seat as long as electrical power is supplied.
System 1 can be manually disengaged by de-energizing the
solenoid.
Upon a failure of the primary channel, the system 1 failure
indicator will provide an electrical signal to automatically
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energize the standby channel solenoid valves (servo systems 2,
3 and 4) and thereby transfer control to the three channel,
force-summed standby mode of operation. Differential pressure
transducers are provided across each of the cylinder ports in
order to provide signals which can be used to determine fail-
ure status. Provisions are made for manual on-off control of
each of the four (4) channels.
Second failures occurring in the standby system will result in
control with some degree of degradation. When one of the
three channels is deactivated, the total servoactuator force
output is degraded by one third (1/3) while the system response
remains unchanged. When a second channel is deactivated, the
system response is unchanged while the force output is reduced
by an additional third. Upon complete de-energization of all
solenoid valves, the triplex actuator is bypassed. Piston
and seal friction are the only constraints on the piston when
totally de-energized. The standby system force-shares three
three servovalves with no deadband in the position control
loop and uses no force equalization network. Avoiding equal-
ization is primarily a result of using single-stage jet pipe
servovalves which have a considerably lower pressure gain than
two-stage valves.
3.1.3.5 General Electric 680J Secondary Actuator
The General Electric 680J Secondary Actuator system is an
electrohydraulic four channel, force voting configuration.
The secondary actuator is comprised of four individual modular
elements, each of which is a small actuator, whose force out-
puts are summed on a rotary summing shaft as shown in figure 9.
The small actuators are connected to the summing shaft by
rocker arms.
One version of the actuator assembly has a centering mechanism
that returns the entire system to center if all channels are
shut off or if all hydraulic pressure is lost. The centering
mechanism is held disengaged by pistons in each actuator
element. Any one piston is sufficient to keep the centering
disengaged. Another version is identical except that in place
of the centering mechanism, a braking mechanism is provided.
In case of shutdown the summing shaft is held in its last
position by the brake. The braking version was developed for
longitudinal control systems where maintaining the pitch
control surface in the last position held before failure was
a requirement.
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Each individual small actuator element is dedicated to one
control signal channel. Figure 10 shows a cross section of
a typical single actuator element. Each element is driven
by a single-stage jet pipe electrohydraulic servovalve. Each
element has a separate LVDT to provide position feedback.
The normal mode of operation is for all four elements to
operate at the same time. The single-stage jet pipe valves
have low enough pressure gains that interchannel input com-
mand differences can be held small enough to eliminate
deadband in the output. The differential pressure across
each channel's piston head is monitored by a differential
pressure sensor which provides electrical information which
can be used for cross channel monitoring and/or comparison.
When the command to one channel differs from the other it will
force fight the other channel and develop a differential pres-
sure relative to the others. When the differential pressure
exceeds a predetermined level, electronic logic will indicate
that the element has failed and initiate a shutdown by
de-energizing the element's solenoid-operated shutoff valve.
The same shutdown sequence is repeated when the second channel
fails. However, upon third channel failure the electronic
logic will shut down both remaining elements since it is not
possible to determine which of the remaining two elements is
good.
3.1.3.6 MRCA Secondary Actuator
The four channel, force-voted, rotary output actuator, shown
in figure 11, was developed by Elliott Flight Automation, Ltd
of England, under a Ministry of Technology contract to develop
a fail-operational stability augmentation system. It is
presently in production by Fairy Hydraulic, Ltd for the NATO
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA).
The actuator is normally utilized as a force summed position
servo. Separate and isolated servoamplifiers are used for
each of the four channels to sum the position command input
and the position feedback and provide a drive for the
electrohydraulic servovalve of each channel.
The system is comprised of four separately controlled small
electrohydraulic actuators which are individually coupled to
a common output member by clutch plates rotating around the
common output shaft. Each plate has six tapered lugs which
engage in six tapered holes in the plate fixed to the common
output shaft. The plates are held in engagement by applying
hydraulic pressure to the outside of the clutch plates driven
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by the actuators. Any difference in position between an
individual actuator and the common output causes the tapered
lugs to ride out along the leading edge of the tapered hole
so that the clutch plate is at a larger distance from the driven
common output plate. For differences less than +10% of the
total stroke the actuator force is still transmitted, but for
larger differences the clutch plate becomes disengaged.
Positive disengagement is then assured by the action of the
spring loaded member which automatically inserts itself
between the plate driven by the disengaged actuator and the
common output member. Sideways movement of the clutch plate
end of the individual actuator output shafts is allowed by
the knuckle joints at each end of the actuator connecting
shaft. The sideways motion of the clutch plate is sensed
by a switch which transmits a failure indication to the pilot.
The +0.5 inch (12.7 mm) travel of the individual actuators
is converted to +20 degrees of output lever rotation so that
the output stroke can be selected by the length of the output
lever.
To avoid disengagement of all four actuator channels due to an
excessive transient load on the output or to a temporary loss
of electrical supplies, a gate mechanism operates on the
actuator output plates such that if any two actuators become
disengaged, all the available travel in the mechanism is taken
up and no further disengagement can take place.
In addition to the electrical position feedback there is a
low-gain mechanical feedback to center the actuator in the
event of the loss of electrical power. In other words, the
actuator will center automatically independent of electrical
power when either hydraulic supply is on. This action is
equivalent to mechanical spring centering which is the confen-
tional but heavier method. The mechanical feedback applies a
force of sufficient magnitude to the armature of the two-stage
servovalve to cause the actuator to return to the mid-position.
The gain of the mechanical feedback is so low that it does not
affect the performance of the actuator which is dominated by
the electrical feedback gain.
3.1.3.7 Boeing 747 Elevator Control (Autoland Option)
This system uses two dual primary surface actuators that are
signalled by the force voted output of three secondary actua-
tors. Two other surface power actuators are signalled by the
outputs of the dual actuators. A simplified schematic of the
basic system is shown in figure 12, and a basic system block
diagram is shown in figure 13. The system consists of three
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Breakout of one or two detents will be caused by large
differences between the secondary actuator control piston
positions. This can either be caused by a failure in the
autopilot, servo amplifier, electrohydraulic valve, or can be
caused by inherent manufacturing tolerances between channels.
The simplest method to accomplish failure detection was found
to be a comparison of each secondary actuator position to the
summed output position. These same signals are used for
equalization.
When the difference between the control piston and the summed
output position exceeds a limit greater than what can be
expected due to maximum manufacturing tolerances for a certain
time, the system is considered to have a failure. (Presently
this limit is set for 7.5 degrees and 1 second for the 7T47).
In order to avoid nuisance warnings and/or disengagements,
this detection level must be higher than differences generated
between channels when maneuvering.
3.1.3.8 Lockheed L-1011 Longitudinal Control
The L-1011 pitch control is provided by a hydraulically
powered horizontal stabilizer with mechanically geared eleva-
tors. Four independent hydraulic systems provide power to
four surface power actuators, any one of which is capable of
control of the airplane.
Four autopilot channels are used to control the airplane in
the fail operational autoland mode. The four autopilot chan-
nels provide signals to two autopilot actuators (secondary
actuators) which command the four surface power actuators
through the mechanical control system. The method of summing
the two actuators is shown in figure 14. The two autopilot
actuators work in a master-slave arrangement where the master
actuator has a force advantage and overpowers the slave
actuator in order to eliminate the deadband that would result
from differences in output between the two channels. Each
secondary actuator output is measured by dual LVDTs to provide
a separate feedback signal to the two autopilot channels that
control each actuator.
The four autopilot channels are in a dual-dual arrangement as
shown in figure 15 where a fault in one dual channel shuts
down that channel and not the other. All four signals are
voted just ahead of the servoamplifiers and all servoamplifiers
receive identical input commands. The outputs of each pair
of servoamplifiers are compared to detect amplifier failures.
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separate autopilots, each driving a separate closed loop
position servo (secondary actuator). Each secondary actuator
displacement is proportional to its respective electrical com-
mand signal. In the schematic, the three actuator control
pistons operate into a common output through preloaded detents.
A pilot feel system that provides centering is also connected
to the output. This common output could be any type of linkage
connecting the three pistons and the centering mechanism. To
provide for triple channel, dual channel, or single
channel operation, each detent can be disengaged such that no
force is transmitted from the disengaged channel to the common
output. The characteristic of the detents when engaged are
such that only a small incremental force is transmitted to
the common shaft after the preload is exceeded (i.e., there is
a low spring gradient after detent breakout).
With all three detents engaged (triple channel configuration),
the spring force and any friction and power actuator valve
loads are reacted by three detent forces with the maximum
force output triple that of a single channel. With no fail-
ures, all three control pistons move in a synchronized fashion.
With a single failure, the system continues to operate even
if the failed channel is not disconnected.
When the three autopilot commands are of different magnitude,
due to tolerances, a disagreement will exist between the three
actuator pistons. This disagreement must be taken up by the
detents, forcing two of them to yield. If the centering spring
is disregarded, the detents in the high and low channels will
be out-of-detent in opposite directions. If the forces from
these two detents balance each other, no force will be required
from the detent with the midvalue position and the output will
be that of the control piston with the midvalue. When the
centering spring is considered, the force required to drive
the centering spring must be obtained from the midvalue chan-
nel's detent. The system will select the midvalue of the
three control piston positions as its output.
In dual and triple channel operation, manufacturing tolerances
between the pitch integrators and null offsets in the glide
slope beam receivers can cause a steady integration which would
result in a hardover elevator command in the non midvalue
autopilot channel(s). To avoid this, an equalizing signal
must be fed to the pitch integrator. The difference between
each secondary actuator control piston position and the summed
output position is used for the equalization signal. This
signal is a measure of each actuator's position difference
from the controlling channel.
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Each of the two autopilot actuators receive two independent
electrical position commands. The signals are summed by the
electrohydraulic servovalve torque motor. Error level
monitoring at the summing amplifiers is used to detect
servovalve and LVDT failures.
3.1.3.9 Concorde Elevon Control
The Concorde pitch control utilizes aerodynamic summing to
increase flight control redundancy. There are three elevons
at the trailing edge of each wing. Each elevon is operated
by its own dual tandem surface power control actuator with
integrated dual secondary actuators (figure 16). There are
three hydraulic supplies, two that are normally connected to
each dual surface power actuator plus a standby system that
is switched in automatically by a pressure operated transfer
valve to replace a depleted or depressurized normal system.
The surface pover actuators are operated in a force summed
arrangement with the main valves synchronized by close
manufacturing tolerances to eliminate force fight.
The actuators can be operated electrically by either of the
two electrohydraulic servovalves that drive the secondary
actuators or by a mechanical input lever. When the power
actuator is being controlled by a secondary actuator the
mechanical input is disconnected. The secondary actuators
are integrated with the surface power actuators. Each sec-
ondary actuator consists of a small slide valve connected to
a torque motor. The small slide valve acts as a pilot valve
to one of the surface power actuator main control valves,
When the samll slide valve is moved by the torque motor it
ports fluid to the ends of one main valve which repositions
both main valves.
Damper and autopilot signals directly control the secondary
actuator, hence the main valve spools and surface power actu-
ators. The pilot's and copilot's controls have transducers
that are connected directly into the autopilot electronics
and provide a fly-by-wire capability through the secondary
actuators. A parallel booster actuator is used to drive the
mechanical control cables to keep the mechanical and elec-
trical surface power actuator inputs in synchronization.
The secondary actuators are controlled by two completely
independent electrical signalling systems, one in operation
and the other one in standby. In case of complete electrical
control system failure, the airplane can be safely flown
with mechanical control.
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A monitoring system detects failures that originate in the
electronics, hydraulic systems or actuators. (Figure 1T)
If there is an electrical failure that causes a spurious
deflection of the control surface the comparator circuits
switch the control to the standby electrical command path.
The switching is done in two groups of surfaces comprising
the inner elevons and the center and outboard elevons on each
wing. For example, if an inner elevon disagreed with the
other surfaces, both inner elevons would be switched to the
standby command path. In case of a second failure in a
group, the surfaces in that group revert to mechanical control.
The other group of surfaces continues to provide autopilot
control functions. There is a spring pot with a microswitch
on each main servovalve to detect stuck valves. The pilot
depressurizes any actuator that signals a stuck valve.
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3.2 TASK 2 - SELECTION OF RECOMMENDED ACTUATION SYSTEMS
The work statement for this task required selecting two
actuator configurations which explore different methods
of implementing redundant actuation with applicability
to the lateral axis as well as the pitch axis for an
AST application.
The systems that were selected for examination and
described in Task 1 are representative of secondary actu-
ator redundancy concepts currently being used in aircraft
as well as those that have been developed for specific
research contracts such as the Survivable Flight Control
System Development sponsored by the USAF and the NASA F-8C
Fly-By-Wire Program. Actuator redundancy techniques under
consideration by NASA for the Space Shuttle actuation
subsystems were also included.
All except one of these systems are categorized as either
force-voted or active/standby systems.
Force-Voted Active/Standby
B2707 HRM-A
HRM-C F-8C (primary mode)
GE 680J Concorde
MRCA
The one exception is the LTV electromechanical rate-summed
system. It was not considered a candidate for critical
flight control systems because:
a. The complex gearing would make it difficult to
prove that jam-type failures would be extremely
remote
b. For the same output force the electromechanical
actuator is larger and heavier than an equivalent
electrohydraulic actuator.
c. The electronics to drive a rate-summed actuator
would require a significant increase in packaging
size, weight and cost. In addition the system
dissipates much more power than required for an
electrohydraulic force-voted actuator.
(Reference 4).
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It had been noted earlier in the Task 1 discussion that
although position summing is a method of achieving a single
valued output of a redundant actuator arrangement, none of
the systems investigated employ this method either on sur-
face actuators or secondary actuators. This type of
configuration is difficult to mechanize practically for more
than two channels because of the complex linkage required.
3.2.1 System Comparison
Each of the systems suitable for AST application was
examined qualitatively with respect to the comparison
factors discussed in Task 1.
Load Sharing
Only actuators in the force-voted category are concerned
with load sharing. The secondary actuators of the force
summed systems all use electronic loop closure. Since
the components that make up feedback loops are essentially
the same, all the systems should have the same load
sharing performance.
Input Mismatch
Here again only force summed arrangements are concerned
with mismatched inputs. The B2707 secondary actuators
system and the HRM-C sensed the mismatch as reflected
on the output in terms of differential pressure at each
individual piston. An electronic signal proportional to
this differential pressure is fed back as an equalization
signal in each control channel, to minimize the mismatch.
The 680J and F8-C systems use no electronic feedback for
equalization but depend on the low pressure gain of the
single stage electrohydraulic servo valve to give the
actuator a low effective spring rate. The lower the actu-
ator spring rate, the more input mismatch can be tolerated
for the same design level of load sharing. The 680J and
F8-C systems are limited to the degree of input mismatch
that they can accommodate because of physical pressure gain
constraint. To operate within these limits, signal condi-
tioning of input commands by means such as electronic
voting is required.
The MRCA system utilized neither feedback equalization nor
reduced actuator stiffness to accommodate input mismatch.
Channel mismatches of up to 10 percent of full command are
absorbed in force detents between each actuator and the
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common output. The detent is constructed to have little
effect on total system stiffness. The system does require
upstream voting or some method to assure that inputs have
differences of less than 10 percent.
Utilization of equalization feedback gives a great amount of
flexibility to accommodate input mismatch and is probably
more desirable than requiring electronic complexity upstream
such as voting to insure closely matched inputs.
Failure Insensitivity
The systems applicable to an advanced SST all meet the
requirements to be operational after two failures. For
clarification, although the MRCA system is presently a
4-actuator configuration powered by two hydraulic supplies,
additional hydraulic systems could be added to meet the
fail-operational requirement.
With respect to surface transients, the force-voted systems
do not rely upon the failure detection and switching to
prevent transients. The magnitude of transients is gov-
erned by the structural stiffness of the mechanical linkage
connecting the individual actuators. As an example, the
individual actuators in the 680J system are close together
and coupled by a very stiff output member. This system has
almost negligible output transient.
In the active/standby systems, output transients are
dependent on the failure detection threshold, switching
time and the position synchronization of the standby system.
Active/standby systems such as the HRM-A type do not suffer
a performance degradation after the first and second fail-
ures. Force-voted systems, however, may suffer a performance
degradation after successive failures. This degradation is
caused by residual force fight between channels and reduced
system force capability.
Failure Detection Capability
By design, none of the force-voted systems requires a
failure detection capability to keep the system safe for
the first failure. As long as there is a majority of
healthy channels the voting system disregards a failed
channel. The failure detection system must, however,
isolate the failed channel within a time consistent with
the probabilities of a second failure.
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All of the force voted systems except the MRCA use the
differential pressure generated across each individual
actuator as the source of failed channel logic. The MRCA
senses motion of the mechanical detent associated with each
actuator. Since immediate detection of a failure is not
critical for safety, the failure detection logic can employ
a reasonable threshold and time delay.
In systems such as the B2707 the equalization feedback,which
is used to minimize effects of input mismatch, degrades the
failure detection capability. Some failures such as ramps
can be equalized and therefore masked from detection.
Failure detection capability in an active/standby system is
critical to the success of the system concept since the
detection of failures and switching to standby is necessary
to be safe. The threshold of detection and the associated
Switching time are set by the allowable surface transients
for a given application and must be significantly smaller
than those that can be allowed in a force-voted system.
These small thresholds make the active/standby system
vulnerable to inadvertent disconnects.
Reliability
Reliability is related to the number of components. Those
systems that utilize separate electromechanical monitors
for each of the three working channels such as the HRM-A
and HRM-C use fewer working channels. Trading the complex-
ity of three monitors for one additional working channel
impacts the overall system reliability. If each control
channel is duplicated with a monitor, the probability of
that channel or its monitor failing is doubled. A three
channel monitored system would fail down to a monitored
single channel operation twice as often as a four channel
system would fail down to two channels.
Self Test Capability
None of the systems examined had specific ability to perform
a self test within the actuator loop, however, each pos-
sessed the necessary sensors to provide logic for self test
mechanization.
Simplicity
In general, the four channel force-voted actuation systems
appear simpler than the three channel systems with monitors.
However, the upstream signal voting and/or channel equaliza-
tion electronics increase the complexity of the force-voted
systems to narrow the difference and make relative simplicity
difficult to judge without further study.
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3.2.2 System Selection
Examination of the force-voted systems shows little
difference in fundamental mechanization. The most signi-
ficant difference is the use of equalization to minimize
the effects of input mismatch as in the B2707 system and
the operation without equalization as in the 680J system.
This difference is a function of the electronics driving
the systems. The B2707 used an unvoted analog system which
had a susceptibility to accumulation of tolerances result-
ing in significant command mismatch. The 680J also is
driven by an analog electronic system but one which has a
monitored voting stage just prior to the actuator, thereby
guarantying a single valued input to the actuators. The
requirement for equalization in the actuator is therefore
eliminated and the failure detection covers only failure
within the actuator loop.
There is little difference in the active/standby systems
examined. The HRM-A remains an active/standby as the sys-
tem fails down to single channel. The F8-C system is a
hybrid system since it fails down to a three channel
force-voted system after the first failure. The Concorde
system is a two channel system but achieves overall fail
operational capability for many dual failures by use of
multiple aerodynamic surfaces (6 elevons) and voting
between pairs of surfaces.
While there is little difference in the variations of either
force-voted or active/standby systems there are significant
philosophical differences between the two categories.
Failure Detection
The active/standby concept requires failure detection
to be safe following failures. The force-voted concept
does not require immediate detection of a failure to
be safe. Failure detection is only required to enable
a failed channel to be shut down before another failure
occurs,
Switching
The standby system must be continually monitored to
assure that it is capable of control if the active
channel fails. Further, somewhere in the system a
device like a switch or blocking valve is required to
operate without prior knowledge of its health to pro-
vide a successful switch to standby. The force-voted
system is comprised of only active channels continually
monitoring each other requiring no switching.
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Performance After Failure
The active/standby concept preserves normal performance
as it fails down from active to standby to second
standby. The force-voted system may suffer a perform-
ance degradation as it fails down. This degradation
can be exhibited in poorer resolution and limited force
output.
Either of these two concepts can be mechanized to meet the
redundancy requirements for an advanced supersonic trans-
port but the philosophical differences in the approach to
redundancy warrant further study.
A force-voted configuration should be mechanized in a manner
similar to the schematic shown in figure 18. The actuator
is a four channel, force-voted electrohydraulic position
servo. The four independently controlled actuator channels
are coupled to a common output. Each actuator has a LVDT
to provide position feedback to its flight control channel.
The differential pressure sensor and bypass valve limit
the maximum differential pressure and provide an electrical
signal proportional to the differential pressure which can
be used for cross channel monitoring and equalization. The
actuator differential pressure sensor could be a pressure
transducer that signals a solenoid operated bypass valve.
The modular nature of the side-by-side design is such that
studies could be performed with fewer or a greater number
of actuator elements.
A schematic of a proposed active/standby study configuration
is shown in figure 19. The actuator is a three channel
active/standby position servo employing monitor channels.
One channel (number 1) is engaged for normal operation.
With a malfunction in the controlling system, a switch is
made to a standby system and there is no loss in output
force or performance. If a malfunction occurs in system 2
a switchover to system 3 will be accomplished in a similar
manner. If system 2 has failed before system 1, failure
of system 1 will cause a switchover to system 3. In this
configuration, only a channel that is operational is
capable of gaining control of the actuator output.
The failure sensing and switching are electronic rather
than hydraulic to allow a greater latitude for experimen-
tation with failure detection levels and switching times.
The actuator can also be arranged with identical modules
side-by-side to allow flexibility in the number of actuator
elements under test.
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3.3 TASK 3. FORMULATION OF MATH MODELS OF THE RECOMMENDED SYSTEMS
Math models of the recommended systems have been formulated.
These models are in such a form that they may be adapted for
piloted simulator evaluations using analog and/or digital
simulation techniques. The math models include all the func-
tions required so that the following items may be studied:
o Normal performance
o Performance after failure
o Channel equalization
o Failure and switching transients
o Failure detection logic
o Critical overload due to aerodynamic hinge moments
o Static stiffness as a function of the number of
hydraulic systems operating
o Feedback malfunctions
The math model of the force voted system is shown in
figures 20 and 21. Table 1 gives nominal parametric data
which will give an actuator representation with adequate
output force and performance for use in either pitch or roll
control. The details of the failure detection and equaliza-
tion box are shown in figure 21. The parametric values for
the failure detection and equalization network must be
developed to be compatible with the airplane and airplane
control axis that the system is used on. Therefore no values
have been given.
The math model of the active/standby system is shown in
figure 22. The parametric data, except the failure detection
level, to construct a nominal actuator representation is given
in table 1. The failure detection level must be set after
the model is matched to an airplane system. The math models
were checked by using the models to write the differential
equations of the system. The equations were solved for
performance characteristics. Application of stability crite-
ria showed that the actuators would be stable. All solutions
provided answers that correlated well with previous analyses
and data obtained by testing actual hardware. These equa-
tions were then checked by dimensional analysis in both
US units and Sl units.
Because of the similarity of the systems and the math models
to others previously simulated without difficulty, computer
simulation would not add to the confidence in the models
gained by paper analysis. Therefore computer simulation that
had been previously planned was not used for verification.
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In order to utilize the math models of the secondary actuators
in a piloted simulation, the actuators must be included in
a simulation that represents the surface power actuators and
an airplane. A math model of a surface power actuator that
would be compatible with the secondary actuator models that
have been presented is shown in figure 23. The surface power
actuator model is sensitive to aerodynamic hinge moments and
changes in hydraulic pressure. For maximum realism the air-
plane model used in conjunction with the actuator model should
be one that contains surface hinge moment data.
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3.4 TASK 4. LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR REDUNDANT ACTUATION
DEVELOPMENT
The draft for the Statement of Work for Phase II is presented
below.
A. SUMMARY
Large gains in supersonic airplane performance and
economy are achievable through the use of advanced flight
control systems. As the advanced large supersonic cruise
transport must take advantage of these gains, it is essen-
tial to fully understand and appreciate the implementation
of these advanced control systems. The use of active
controls makes this technology transferrable to other
classes of aircraft.
This program, to develop multiple redundant actuation
concepts and associated hardware required for the advanced
SST flight control system, has accomplished under Phase I,
(1) a review of recent developments in redundant control
systems, (2) the selection of the two most probable can-
didate redundant actuator concepts, and (3) the
construction of math models of the two selected
configurations.
The two actuator configurations selected are a four
channel force-voted system and a three channel active/
standby system.
The force voted configuration is similar to both the
Boeing SST Horizontal Stabilizer Electric Command Actuator
and the Secondary Actuator developed by General Electric
for the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory's F-r
Survivable Flight Control System.
The active/standby configuration is similar to the
secondary actuator developed by Hydraulic Research and
Manufacturing Company for the NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center's Project Space Shuttle.
Under Phase II of this same program, these candidate
systems are to be further investigated and evaluated to
(1) formulate the basic knowledge and experience needed
of the operational and performance characteristics of
these concepts to establish a technology base for mech-
anizing advanced flight control systems, and (2) to
define a research tool to be used in conjunction with an
ARC simulator to allow a genuine determination of system
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performance, handling qualities effects, and various
failure modes with flight crew interaction and simulated
airplane response.
B. WORK STATEMENT
The proposed Phase II study of redundant actuation will
be divided into five tasks. The statement of work for
each task is as follows.
1. Task 1 - Configuration Definition of Redundant
Actuator Concepts
The Phase 1 study that determined the system concepts
to be further studied in this phase emphasized the
basic requirements for redundant control systems.
The two concepts are to be implemented in such a
manner that they will:
o Meet normal performance requirements
o Have limited interchannel force fight
o Be tolerant of input mismatch
o Operate after first and second failures
o Operate at reduced redundancy levels
o Allow failure monitoring
o Have self test capability
The analysis in this task will produce a detail design
definition of the two actuator system concepts and
will provide quantitative assessment of their practi-
cality for the AST airplane design with consideration
given to scaling of important parameters to other
aircraft. The factors to be considered are all of
those stated above, plus failure induced transients,
load sharing after failure, stability of the basic
system before and after failure, filtering require-
ments, the need for mechanical backup to the electric
command mode of operation, and delay time to regain
control after failure.
2. Task 2 - AST Actuation System Requirements
The B2707-300 pitch axis configuration as currently
mechanized in the ARC simulation will be used to
establish parametric data needed for actuation system
development. The configuration sensitive parameters
such as rate of signal input, dynamic response, reso-
lution, and airplane tolerance to failure transients
will be determined to formulate the actuation system
design requirements.
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3. Task 3 - Computer Simulation of Redundancy Concents
The purpose of this simulation is to define the nominal
design parameters to be used in the design of the
single axis mini-rig. This requires a motion simula-
tion with a pilot. To fulfill this requirement the
contractor will furnish a detailed math model of
the two actuation systems.
ARC will then implement the math models on the
simulator. The contractor will submit a test plan
for simulator checkout procedure and to gather mini-
rig design parameters. The test plane will include
a time schedule and pilot requirements. The con-
tractor will perform the test at ARC with appropriate
ARC support.
4. Task 4 - Mini-Rig Definition
The extent of the flight control system required to
be represented by the mini-rig will be determined.
Based in part on the successful operation of the cor-
puter simulation of the AST and control systems
implemented in Task 3, the advisability of providing
a mini-rig for both actuation system concepts will be
determined. The mini-rig will be limited to the
representation of the secondary actuator system and
associated electronics with the surface actuators
remaining part of the computer simulation. The sec-
ondary actuators will be manufactured to full scale
reflecting airplane actuator quality and performance
but retaining the flexibility required for the planned
test program.
The feasibility of using one universal rig or a
separate rig for each redundancy concept will be
considered. If two dedicated mini-rigs are used,
consideration will be given to assure the ability to
directly compare results from both rigs. Data
requirements such as FSAA and computer interface,
scaling, instrumentation requirements, hydraulic and
electrical system power requirements, and other rele-
vant constraints will be specified by the contractor.
A mini-rig design specification for each concept will
be prepared to allow completion of a mini-rig design
and fabrication and will contain at least the
following:
a. Appropriate construction and material
specifications
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b. System functional description
c. Detail performance requirements including
range of adjustments on critical parameters
d. Safety requirements
e. Appropriate quality assurance provisions
f. General acceptance test procedures
5. Task 5 - Planning for Mini-Rig Design Fabrication
and Usage
a. A plan will be formulated, in conjunction with
ARC, for mini-rig design and fabrication.
b. The contractor will provide a descriptive
document of the mini-rig's operational capabilities.
c. The contractor will provide a recommended test
plan to investigate design problems relating to
AST flight control actuation.
C. PROGRAM SCHEDULE
The recommended schedule for accomplishing the Phase II
work statement is shown in figure 24.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS
Advanced airplanes will need to use redundant flight control
actuators to achieve reliability approaching that of the
basic airplane because operational flight controls will be
essential for safe flight and acceptable airplane handling
qualities.
Surface restraint to meet the fail safe requirements for
flutter prevention will dictate the minimum redundancy
levels allowable for control surface power actuators.
Airplanes with redundant flight control surfaces may have
dual surface power actuators if a third hydraulic system
is provided. Control surfaces that are critical for con-
trol functions will require at least three actuators per
surface in order to meet FAA requirements and provide an
adequate level of safety.
Reliability requirements for actuators that amplify
autopilot, stability augmentation and pilot commands to
provide inputs to the control surfaces are determined
by the need to operate in spite of control signal mal-
functions. Actuation systenswith fault corrective
capability that will meet the system reliability require-
ments and satisfy FAA regulations require at least four
active channels or three monitored channels. Surface power
actuators could be mechanized with this level of redundancy
but it has been found to be more efficient to utilize small
secondary actuators to provide a reliable single input to
the surface power actuators.
Based on a review and examination of current redundant
actuation systems, two concepts were found to be represen-
tative of secondary actuator mechanization which would meet
advanced airplane flight control system requirements. Both
of these systems should be studied by NASA since they reflect
different design philosophies. The two actuator configura-
tions are a four-channel force-voted system and a three-
channel active/standby system.
Redundant control systems have operating and failure
characteristics that are affected by system design and that
interact with the pilot and the airplane in which they are
installed. Redundant actuators should be studied in con-
junction with a pilot and an AST airplane to understand pilot
reaction and airplane response to variations in control sys-
tem characteristics and failures. NASA Ames has a facility
that is well suited to pilot-control system-airplane studies
in the FSAA. Use of the FSAA to study redundant actuator
mechanization will gain technical knowledge that will benefit
future advanced airplane designs.
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TABLE 1
ACTUATOR PARAMETERS
Value
Symbol SI Units US Units
A Piston area 1.9 x 10-4m2 0.294 in2
B1  Linkage freeplay 5.08 x 10-5m 0.002 in
B2  Hysteresis due to friction .047 ma .047 ma
Cp Flow gain/pressure gain 8.78x10 1 3  N 3.69x10-4 ib/in
N ibf
D Damping/channel 1402 N- 8 inse
Ff Coulomb friction/channel 17.8 N 4 lbf
FlF 2 etc Actuator force output N lbf
H1 Feedback gain (KxKdnKf ) 204.33 V/m 5.19 V/in
Ka Servo amp gain 57.6 ma/V 57.6 ma/V
Kc Centering spring variable N/m variable lb/in
Kdm Demodulator gain 1.25 vdc/vac 1.25 vdc/vac
Kf feedback amp gain 0.296 V/V 0.296 V/V
KL  Open loop gain 122 sec-1 122 sec
-1
Kp Pressure gain 2.24x106 N/m 325lb/in2
ma
KS1 Actuator structural spring 1.98 x 106 N/m 1.13 x 104 bf/in
KS2 Actuator rod spring 3.5 x 106 N/m 2 x 104 lbf/in
K Actuator 4AgKS1  2.55 x 107 N/m 1.46 x 105 lbf/in
dynamic spring KSIL+4A is
K,  Valve flow gain 1.97 x 10
-6 ma .12 in3/ma
Kx LVDT output 550 v/m 14 v/in
L Actuator stroke (2 XLIM) + 0.0127 m + 0.5 in
lbmsec2
M Load mass/channel 
20 kgm .114 in
Pm Maximum actuator AP 6.9 N/m2  1000 psi
PT Bypass pressure 6.4 N/m2  930 psi
X0X1 etc Output displacements m in
Oil bulk modulus 1.03 N/m2  150,000 lb/in 2
Vl,V2 etc Input signal voltage V V
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